Long-Term Impacts of Military Drawdown on the Industrial Base by Martyn, Anton H.
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works
3-24-2016
Long-Term Impacts of Military Drawdown on the
Industrial Base
Anton H. Martyn
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Martyn, Anton H., "Long-Term Impacts of Military Drawdown on the Industrial Base" (2016). Theses and Dissertations. 370.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/370
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF MILITARY 
DRAWDOWN ON INDUSTRIAL BASE 
 
THESIS 
 
Anton H. Martyn, Captain, USAF 
 
AFIT-ENS-MS-16-M-115 
 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
  
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; 
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United 
States Government.  This material is declared a work of the United states Government 
and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. 
  
  
AFIT-ENS-MS-16-M-115 
 
 
LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF MILITARY 
DRAWDOWN ON INDUSTRIAL BASE 
 
THESIS 
 
 
 
Presented to the Faculty 
 
Department of Operational Sciences 
 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
 
Air University 
 
Air Education and Training Command 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
 
Degree of Master of Science in Logistics and Supply Chain Management 
 
 
 
 
Anton H. Martyn, BA 
 
Captain, USAF 
 
March 2016 
 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; 
DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED. 
  
  
AFIT-ENS-MS-16-M-115 
 
 
 
LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF MILITARY 
DRAWDOWN ON INDUSTRIAL BASE 
 
 
Anton H. Martyn, BA 
Captain, USAF 
 
 
Committee Membership: 
 
 
William Cunningham, PhD 
Chair 
 
Alan W. Johnson, PhD 
Member 
 
 
 
  
v 
 
Abstract 
 Since World War II, competition in the defense industry has fallen by over 90 
percent.  Over half of contracts currently executed by the United States Navy and Air 
Force are awarded without any competition.  With the recent defense budget cuts, and an 
extended period of reduced defense spending ahead, more of which is going to 
sustainment and overhead than ever before, each year prime contractors are fighting over 
an even smaller piece of the procurement pie, which could have a deleterious effect on 
national security if these contractors go out of business or further consolidate through 
mergers.  This study used data from the Federal Procurement Data System and the 
Securities Exchange Commission to track 13 of the DoD’s top 100 contractors from 2010 
through 2015 to determine if a relationship exists between this reduced procurement 
spending and the financials indicators of the tracked companies.  Three of the six models 
developed showed a relationship between procurement spending and financial indicators 
at the .05 significance level:  those of Price-to-Earnings ratio, revenue, and revenue 
growth.  The results of this study give cause for concern about the ever condensing 
defense industry and suggest that increased care be taken to ensure that the existing base 
of contractors be cultivated though strategic management of procurement funding. 
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I.  Introduction 
Problem Statement 
The United States is reliant on defense contractors to provide complements to 
organic production.  The large capital investments and long development cycles involved 
in this economic sector provide significant barriers to entry for new companies, and the 
limited customer base makes companies particularly susceptible to fluctuations in 
demand.  As Department of Defense (DoD) funding for procurement decreases, 
companies in this industry could be forced to consolidate or exit the market, reducing 
competition and reducing the market capacity to produce materials and equipment.  This 
would have a deleterious effect on the ability of the United States to wage war in future 
armed conflicts. 
Historically, reduced procurement budgets have generally resulted in 
consolidation of the defense sector through mergers and to a lesser extent diversification 
of defense contractors into consumer sectors or exit from the defense sector by 
contractors.  During recapitalization periods, the defense sector has not historically 
expanded to counteract this consolidation.  As a result, the defense sector goes into this 
latest military drawdown in an already concentrated state, reducing the ability of defense 
contractors to maintain solvency through mergers.  While more companies are attempting 
to diversify, crossover between the defense and consumer sectors remains limited.  
Therefore, the potential exists for defense contractors to exit the defense sector during 
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this drawdown period, reducing production capability available when the next 
recapitalization occurs. 
This research examines the degree to which a prolonged military drawdown can 
impact the profitability and financial health of defense contractors providing support 
capabilities to the United States Air Force (USAF).  As we continue to deal with budget 
cuts for the foreseeable future, and an accelerated pace of change in the defense industry, 
a study of the long-term impact to the financial health of these companies is needed 
sooner, rather than later, in order to determine how significant these cuts are to national 
defense, and whether additional funding need be budgeted to maintain current 
capabilities. (Lynn 2014) 
Research Questions 
The key research questions answered by this research include: 
1.  Are large prime contractor revenues and profit margins related to procurement 
spending? 
2.  Will a reduction in sales for large prime contractors due to a military drawdown 
impact the financial ratios of these companies? 
Hypotheses 
The critical hypotheses that were tested by this research include: 
1.  Revenues of large prime contractors are related to defense procurement spending. 
2.  Decreases in procurement spending negatively impact the financial ratios of large 
prime contractors. 
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Research Focus 
This study covers, specifically, large defense prime contractors, i.e. contractors 
that contract directly with the US government and who may or may not then subcontract 
to smaller companies.  The relationship between procurement spending and the financial 
indicators of these large prime contractors was examined to determine whether there 
remains cause for concern with regard to the health of the defense industrial base.   
Methodology 
Financial records were collected for each of 13 companies identified by the 
Federal Procurement Data System’s (FPDS) Top 100 Contractors Report which met all 
other selection criteria. Their revenues, profits, and financial ratios were collected and a 
regression model was developed to determine the relationship between these performance 
measures and DoD procurement spending. 
Assumptions/Limitations 
Due to the concentrated nature of the defense industry, the sample size for 
examining a correlation and subsequent impact of a decreased procurement budgets on 
contractor revenues is small.  As a result, individual contracts can compose a 
disproportionately large amount of revenue, and therefore the proposed model is 
subjected to a large amount of variability.  Additionally, while overall trends in the 
economy are accounted for through the use price indexes and exchange rates, many cost 
drivers vary on a company by company basis, and lack of expertise on each of the 
companies in question, as well as time constraints, preclude analyzing each company for 
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cost drivers unrelated to the federal budgetary process.  Likewise, the uncertainty present 
in predicting future federal budget allocations presents a significant likelihood of actual 
future procurement falling outside of modeled parameters.    Finally, the five year time 
period over which the observations are taken is relatively short, making projections for 
any particular company difficult, and reducing the model’s ability to account for auto-
regression.  For these reasons, this study’s results are intended to serve as a baseline 
indicator of financial risk to defense contractors in general, to determine general levels of 
financial health within the defense industrial base.  Less emphasis is placed on predicting 
actual impacts to any specific contractor. 
An additional limitation of this study is that dollar figures are not adjusted to a 
baseline year.  While this should not heavily impact the model due to fact that most 
performance measures are ratios and therefore not impacted by variable inflation, the 
measure of revenue is susceptible to inflation.  This is in part mitigated by the heavy 
reliance on same year procurement spending to determine projected revenues.  
Compensation for autocorrelation remained impacted, as inflation causes the relationship 
between revenues in different years to vary over time; however, due to the timeline for 
data collection being limited to six years, compensation for autocorrelation over long 
time lags is not being explored. 
Implications 
 Identifying the impact of government procurement spending on future weapon 
system development and current weapon system sustainment capability provides 
decision-makers a better indicator of whether current budget cuts created through reduced 
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procurement can be maintained without negatively impacting businesses which are key to 
our national defense strategies.  Chiefly, maintaining a healthy defense industrial base 
contributes to retaining a necessary surge capacity in the event of hostilities and 
encourages competition, resulting in lower peace-time sustainment costs. 
Surge Capacity 
 Multiple times in the history of the United States, our manufacturing capacity has 
been subverted from consumer production to war materiel production.  While this was 
effective when technological requirements of our military equipment were relatively 
mundane, as systems become more advanced, more specialized, and more reliant on 
computer networks, it becomes more difficult to subvert consumer production to war 
materiel production.  Additionally, there is less crossover between consumer and defense 
markets, as demonstrated by the fact that defense contractors find it difficult to diversify 
into consumer markets.  It is reasonable to believe that converting the production of 
companies in the consumer market to war production would be just as difficult. 
 It is for this reason that the United States industrial base of active defense 
contractors needs to be maintained in a state which is capable of surging production 
capacity to full-scale war levels. 
Peace-time Costs 
 In consumer markets, it is well understood that competition is important to 
keeping prices down, both because it encourages cost reducing measures by 
manufacturers, and because a company with a monopoly can keep prices above the 
equilibrium price to maximize profit.  If contractors are unable to maintain solvency 
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during a military drawdown and are forced to consolidate through mergers, the amount of 
competition in the defense industry subsequently decreases.  Even when multiple prime 
contractors exist, they often sub-contract with many of the same companies.  Our defense 
industrial base has already become so tightly woven that contractors effectively operate 
as either oligopolies or monopolies. 
Already, half of all contracts across the Navy and Air Force are uncontested.  
(Lynn, 2014)  With the lack of competition, and the fact that many DoD contracts are 
priced using the cost-plus method, there’s little incentive for contractors without 
competition to keep costs down.  Even for contracts not priced out using cost-plus, the 
government has an incentive to keep its prime contractors in business, especially if there 
aren’t other suitable substitutes, so any costs eventually get passed on to the government. 
The DoD is not the sole player in realizing national defense objectives, and 
factoring the performance of other key players into strategic planning can ensure the DoD 
retains access to leading-edge technologies for weapon system development and 
sustainment now and in the future.  
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II. Literature Review 
Background 
This literature review examines past and current studies on the impact on the 
industrial base of a previous military drawdown following the Cold War and collapse of 
the Soviet Union, and the current drawdown.  It explores the coping strategies used by 
companies of the time and those companies which have persisted through today. 
The examination of previous studies focused on the consolidation and 
diversification strategies of contractors following military drawdowns and the success of 
those strategies.  Studies regarding the current military drawdown were examined more 
for the concerns they express and to determine what data is currently available and/or has 
already been considered. 
Cold War Drawdown 
At the conclusion of the Cold War, much of the need for military weapons 
development was curtailed.  As a result, the money budgeted to defense procurement was 
reduced by 65 percent between 1985 and 1999, and prime contractors turned to other 
operations to replace this lost revenue. (Bell 1999)  
Sable discusses two primary methods of such revenue recoupment, diversification 
into non-military markets and consolidation through mergers.  When neither of these 
options were used, the most likely scenario was downsizing.  Sable concludes that 
military contractors were unsuccessful at breaking into civilian markets, and that the 
primary effective means of survival was downsizing. (Sable 1993) 
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Instead of focusing on structural changes to an organization, Bitzinger 
differentiates adjustment strategies based on intent.  He mentions five broad options, 
leaving the defense sector, holding out and preserving core capabilities, diversifying, 
non-military government expansion, and foreign markets.  He explains that the options a 
contractor is most likely to use is heavily dependent on the level of dependency to 
defense contracts.  In doing so, he breaks contractors down into several groups: low-
dependency defense contractors, defense primes, and smaller firms. (Bitzinger 1994) 
Low-dependency defense contractors are those which are already highly 
diversified and only rely on defense contracts for a small portion of their revenue.  They 
are most easily able to weather a downturn in procurement spending, and may continue to 
operate a defense portion of their business for the later opportunities it affords.  That said, 
they are also the most likely to exit the defense sector if money becomes too tight.  
Defense primes, on the other hand, possess little non-defense business, and are most 
likely to weather droughts in procurement, as diversification becomes the bigger financial 
risk.  Bitzinger suggests that it’s these contractors, like Lockheed, Northrop, and 
Raytheon, who will receive preferential treatment in funding decisions when money is 
tight.  The third group, smaller firms, has the same vulnerability to changing procurement 
funding that defense primes do, but are less able to diversify, downsize, or cut costs.  
Those which do not provide a niche defense capability are most likely to suffer during a 
downturn. (Bitzinger 1994) 
Despite Bitzinger’s assertion that small to medium sized companies were most at 
risk, the majority of research from the Cold War drawdown was on prime contractors, 
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due in large part to mergers.  The number of mergers between prime contractors in the 
1990s caused concern as competition for contracts declined.  A study by Bell for the Air 
War College explored these mergers and increased vertical integration among prime 
contractors.  His data showed that the defense industry had become extremely 
concentrated in certain sectors.  “Looking back to the end of World War II, the US had 
26 aircraft, 16 tank, 22 missile and 36 ship and submarine manufacturers . . . [by 1996] 
the US possessed only two contractors who produced bomber aircraft, four who produced 
fighter aircraft, one tank contractor, one strategic missile contractor and two expendable 
launch vehicle contractors,” (Bell 1999)  This equates to a more than 90 percent decrease 
in competition among these types of defense contractors.  Bell’s work called for 
additional studies to determine the impact of this consolidation on competition. 
Ray explored the potential for Civil-Military Integration via three different 
methods:  conversion, diversification, and dual-use science and technology.  He stressed 
the differences between commercial and defense markets, and found that of the three 
proposed methods, only dual-use research and development was a viable way to expand 
the Defense Industrial Base. In executing this strategy, he recommended that such 
integration occur in the earliest stages of acquisition programs, and pointed out that the 
greatest barriers to execution are in regulatory requirements. (Ray 1998) 
Current Drawdown 
The current drawdown came in the form of sequestration, a blunt instrument of 
funding reduction called for by the 2011 Budget Control Act.  This drawdown is 
fundamentally different from the one experienced at the end of the Cold War.  There are 
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still technologically advanced threats to consider, and as shown by the studies conducted 
in the 1990s, we no longer have room for horizontal consolidation of prime contractors. 
A study released by the RAND institute in 2013 focusing on the Air Industrial 
Base (AIB) emphasizes that while there was no competition to U.S. power at the end of 
the Cold War, there is now a technologically advanced threat in the Pacific theater.  
Moreover, in their report, Arena, Graser and DeLuca show that funding which could 
normally be allocated to procurement is tied up in ongoing operations and a more 
aggressive posture, contributing to high expenditures in operations and maintenance 
(O&M) which are near record highs despite a declining budget. (Arena 2013) 
Despite a decrease in overall procurement funding, there has not yet been a round 
of consolidation like in post-Cold War drawdown.  This is in part due to the fact that 
procurement expenditures in key areas such as the AIB have remained steady, and 
according to Arena, Graser, and DeLuca’s work, will continue to remain steady through 
the end of the decade.  However, this only explains some sectors of the defense industry.  
Lynn, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, argues for a different explanation, 
claiming that there is little opportunity for further consolidation.  He states that more than 
half of contracts awarded by the Navy and Air Force in 2012 were awarded without any 
competition at all.  While Lynn uses this to imply that we no longer get the value for our 
taxpayer money we once commanded, there are additional implications in the coping 
strategies still available to prime contractors with no consolidation options. (Lynn 2014) 
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Scope of the Problem 
In the currently concentrated defense industry, without opportunity for 
consolidation, and in light of historically poor track records for diversifying into civilian 
sectors, what options are left to prime contractors?  As Sable stated, baring consolidation, 
downsizing is the most common effective strategy.  It is also clear that certain sectors of 
the defense industry, such as the AIB, are not seeing reductions in funding commensurate 
with overall budget cuts from sequestration.  While insufficient research has been 
conducted to determine which sectors are more negatively impacted, it logically follows 
that if sectors such as the AIB are not experiencing reductions in revenues, while total 
revenue across the industry is falling, that some sectors will experience 
disproportionately lower revenues as a result of the drawdown.  In the event that these 
sectors are also sectors in which there is only one prime contractor, there is a risk of 
losing procurement capacity for a surge or production capability entirely if there are no 
available substitutes and the prime contractor goes out of business. 
Following the drawdown at the end of the Cold War, Chatman conducted a 
quantitative study on the solvency, efficiency, and profitability of selected defense 
industry contractors using financial ratios.  While Chatman’s study found solvency of 
defense contractors following the drawdown to be generally positive, with 22 of the 28 
sample companies showing improving current ratios and 17 of 28 showing improving 
debt to equity ratios over the period of the drawdown, the defense industry showed 
poorer solvency conditions than industry averages. (Chatman 1995) 
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While results for profitability were poorer in absolute terms, with only 12 and 13 
of 28 firms maintaining return on assets or return on investment, respectively, over the 
same period, these figures were still better than the industry average over the same 
period.  It is unclear, however, how much of this is attributed to consolidation, as several 
of the firms listed in the study had conducted mergers, a strategy already identified as 
suspect in this current drawdown.  Based on these results, solvency may be an area 
needing particular study in the current drawdown. (Chatman 1995) 
Theoretical Model  
Chatman’s quantitative model provides a clear set of metrics which can be used to 
evaluate defense contractors based on industry accepted measures of solvency.  While 
Chatman’s work was broad in scope, a more focused study could also examine the 
mathematical relationship between these metrics and the defense procurement budget.  
Such a focus would necessitate careful selection of the sample firms and independent 
variables, based on risk factors identified in past research. 
Bitzinger provides insight into one such independent variable.  His discussion of 
dependency on defense contracts highlights the importance of revenue streams in a 
heterogeneous defense industry.  Where previous research focused almost entirely on 
large prime contractors in the AIB, this study examined corporations of varying 
dependency.  This can be accounted for determining the percentage of revenue that each 
company obtains from the government. (Bitzinger 1994) 
Hooker and Knetter identify two other important variables in their research, which 
also establishes a basis for the impact of procurement spending on the economy as a 
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whole, as reflected in employment rates.  While not focusing on the performance of 
individual companies, employment is an important indicator in business performance, 
and the use of the producer price index (PPI) for crude oil and the trade weighted average 
exchange index for the US dollar should translate to other performance indicators. 
(Hooker and Knetter 1997) 
Hypotheses 
Previous research offers unclear results regarding correlation between 
procurement funding and financial indicators.  Hooker and Knetter’s research showed 
that large decreases in state military procurement, a drop of more than $100 per capita, 
had a disproportionately large impact on employment growth rates, while smaller 
negative changes in procurement and large positive changes in procurement did not 
produce statistically significant results. (Hooker and Knetter 1997)   
By contrast, Chatman’s research showed mixed results.  His data showed that 
while defense firms were generally less solvent than the overall U.S. manufacturing 
industry, those companies which were most dependent on defense contracts were more 
solvent, though less profitable, than those companies which were only loosely dependent 
on defense contracts. (Chatman 1995)  In addition, the literature review conducted in the 
RAND study by Arena et al. was contradictory.  Depending on the segment of the 
defense sector being examined, and the definition used for what constitutes a competitive 
industrial base, the data seems to suggest that the AIB is at the same time stable and 
atrophying. (Arena 2013)  It is this uncertainty among previous studies that necessitates a 
more quantitative approach through the use of regression analysis.  
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III. Methodology 
Methodology 
Regression analysis was the primary methodology employed.  Specifically, the 
relationship between prime contractor financial indicators and procurement funding was 
examined.  The purpose of using regression analysis is to determine what impact the 
decrease in procurement funding may have had on contractor financial indicators. 
Contractor Selection 
Before the regression analysis was conducted, however, an initial selection of 
companies of interest was conducted.  For the initial companies’ selection, a list was 
pulled from the Federal Procurement Data System’s (FPDS) Top 100 Contractors Report, 
specifically, the Top 100 Contractors for the DoD.  From this list, only corporations 
which were publicly traded American companies were considered.  Additionally, 
companies whose primary products were commodities for which there are a large number 
of customers, such as oil and fuels, were excluded. Furthermore, as the RAND 
Corporation had already conducted a study on the AIB, these companies were also 
excluded.   
The remaining list of companies of interest was further pared down to companies 
for which financial data was available for at least the last five years.  Several companies 
were later excluded due to mergers which occurred during the period of the study, and 
others were excluded as subsidiaries of a larger corporation in the study. 
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Data Sources 
After the 13 companies of interest were selected, their financial records for the 
past six years were obtained from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
which keeps electronic records for all publically traded American companies.  
Specifically, the 10-K annual reports from FY 2009 through FY2014 were used.  
Selected financial data, consolidated statements of income, and consolidated balance 
sheets were pulled from these annual reports.  From these data tables, values were 
transcribed or calculated for percentage of revenues from the government, annual 
revenues, revenue growth over previous year, annual profits, profit margin, percent 
change in annual profit over previous year, and the following ratios:  current ratio, price-
to-earnings ratio, debt-to-equity ratio, and diluted earnings per share (EPS).  The 
historical stock prices of each company were also obtained via Scottrade historical 
records.  Note that only five years’ worth of observations were made, the sixth year of 
reports were collected for the purposes of providing lag variables and year-over-year 
percentage changes in revenue. 
Procurement spending data was obtained for the same time period from the Office 
of Management and Budget historical tables, namely, table 5.1, “Budget Authority by 
Function and Subfunction: 1976-2020” to determine the total budget allocated to 
appropriations.  Only procurement funds for national defense were considered.  Future 
projected procurement spending was based on these same figures, plus the restrictions on 
budget growth placed by the 2011 Budget Control Act.  To account for fiscal years which 
did not match up with the federal fiscal year, the procurement amount associated with 
 16 
 
each K-10 statement was the weighted average of the previous and current fiscal year’s 
procurement budget, weighted based on number of month in each fiscal year covered by 
the statement timeline. 
Two additional factors were considered based on previous studies:  oil prices and 
exchange rates.  Oil prices are used due to its contribution as a cost driver through 
influence of oil prices on logistics costs.  An exchange index is likewise used to account 
for exchange rate fluctuations on the cost of foreign outsourcing, services, or raw 
materials. 
Oil prices were captured using the 12-month rolling average of the PPI for crude 
oil, as maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, at the end of the fiscal years for 
which each company’s K-10’s were filed.  Exchange rates were captured using the Trade 
Weighted U.S. Dollar Index: Major Currencies exchange rate (TWEX), as provided by 
the Federal Reserve Economic Data.  Again, the values used for regression analysis were 
the 12-month rolling averages.  
Tools and Format 
Statistical analysis was conducted in JMP.  Six dependent variables were 
examined:  D/E, Price-to-Earnings (P/E) ratio, CR, profit margin, revenue, and year-over-
year revenue growth.  For all variables, a regression analysis was conducted with an 
alpha value of 0.05 as a cut off, though models displaying an alpha value of over .05 but 
under 0.1 were also considered, provided the total cumulative p-value between all 
variables in the model remained below 0.1.  The independent variables of interest are 
percent of revenue received from the government, the 12-month weighted average 
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defense procurement funding, the 12-month rolling average PPI for Crude Oil, and the 
12-month rolling average TWEX.    Of these, the primary independent variable of interest 
is U.S defense procurement spending.  A time lag variable was also included for several 
of the dependent variables to account for the highly company-specific nature of 
performance figures, and each model also included a time lag variable for procurement if 
significant, to account for the delayed impact of procurement decisions due to contract 
implementation timelines.  The reason for employing multiple models is two-fold; first, 
the short length of time over which data was collected resulted in only a few data points 
for each company, which presents issues with regard to degrees of freedom for extensive 
multivariate models.  Additionally, many of the variables, both independent and 
dependent, have the potential for multicollinearity, and the use of multiple models kept 
this to a minimum.  To that end, all final models had VIF scores under 5 for all 
independent variables. 
Of note, for the financial ratio P/E, the data was inversely transformed, as small 
relative profits cause large positive values of P/E, where a relatively large profit typically 
causes small values of P/E, and likewise for losses; an inverse transformation keeps the 
data relevant over the full range of values.  Lower (non-negative) P/E ratios generally 
indicate a stock market perception of higher risk or lower earnings growth potential, but 
can also indicate improved financial performance when compared to historical 
performance.  Negative P/E ratios are not traditionally used to evaluate company 
performance, however, they were calculated and retained for the purposes of the model to 
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preserve any statistical relationship.  As a result, the interpretations provided by this 
model are not applicable when P/E ratios are negative. 
Scope of Interest 
This methodology identifies the relationship between key economic indicators for 
the set of sample companies and defense procurement spending.  These economic 
indicators are accepted measures of financial performance, and while not definitive, do 
provide insight into the risk of each company going out of business during a military 
drawdown.  While other more qualitative methodologies may capture more company-
specific nuances of solvency and company viability that cannot be examined through this 
quantitative study, as qualitative data on companies can be difficult beyond the resources 
of this study to capture, this study focused on annual reports to provide a more industry 
generalized look. 
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IV. Results 
Overview 
Of the six dependent variables examined, three showed a relationship with 
procurement at the 0.05 significance level:  D/E, revenue, and revenue growth, with p-
values of 0.0057, 0.0196, and 0.0117 respectively.  One additional dependent variable 
showed a relationship with procurement at the 0.1 significance level, however, this was 
only evident when a variable for 1-year lag in procurement was also included, and these 
two variables together had a combined p-value of over 0.1.  In all cases except the 
revenue model, procurement without any applied transformation showed the lowest p-
values.  In the revenue model, the logarithmic transformation of procurement spending 
offered the lowest p-value.  
While a temporal variable, TWEX, PPI for Crude Oil, and percent of revenue 
received from the government were also considered as independent variables, and in 
some cases showed a relationship with the dependent variables singly or in groups, in no 
case were they statistically significant when paired with procurement or any of its 
transformations. 
Debt to Equity Ratio 
The final model for regression of D/E included the independent variables of 
procurement, procurement lagged by one year, and D/E lagged by one year.  This yielded 
an r-square of 0.72, due primarily to the strong correlation with D/E 1-year lag.  The p-
values for procurement and the procurement 1-year lag were 0.0575 and 0.0835, 
 20 
 
respectively.  While this suggests a potential relationship between procurement spending 
and contractor D/E ratio, it was not significant to an alpha of 0.05.  Of note, the data 
shows that any potential relationship between procurement or procurement 1-year lag and 
D/E are likely opposite each other, meaning the D/E ratio may be related to changes in 
procurement, not actual procurement levels themselves.  
 
Figure 1: Debt-to-Equity Ratio Model 
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Several data points were excluded from this test based on circumstances beyond 
the scope of this study.  For the year of 2010, OshKosh Corporation was excluded due to 
a one billion dollar impairment of goodwill the year prior to the study, which led to a 
significant adjustment in equity.  As a one-year D/E lag was essential to the model, this 
could not be reconciled.  Booz Allen Hamilton was excluded from the model entirely due 
to a $1 billion dividend payout mid-study which increased their D/E ratio nearly ten-fold.  
Finally, for the year 2010, AAR Corporation was excluded due to a lack of historical D/E 
ratio data for use in the lag variable. 
When validating the model, it initially fails the test for normality, but passes when 
the two outliers are excluded from the data set with a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.25.  
Examining the Cook’s D Influence reveals that no points are overly influential in the 
model, with the highest value being approximately 0.19.  The model also passes a 
breusch-pagan test for constant variance with a p-value of 0.18.  Finally, when the data is 
aligned sequentially by date of financial statement, a durbin-watson test yields a value of 
0.23, indicating no auto-correlation among the residuals. 
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Figure 2: Debt-to-Equity Ratio Residuals Histogram 
 
 
Figure 3: Debt-to-Equity Ratio Shapiro-Wilk Test 
 
 
Figure 4: Debt-to-Equity Ratio Cook’s D Influence 
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Figure 5: Debt-to-Equity Ratio Durbin-Watson Test 
 
Price-to-Earnings Ratio 
Procurement was the only independent variable shown to have a relationship with 
P/E at the 0.05 level of significance, with a p-value of 0.0057.  As mentioned previously, 
P/E data was inversely transformed to more accurately depict a continuous relationship of 
perceived financial performance.  The data shows that higher procurement levels are 
related to lower P/E ratios to an r-square of 0.12.  
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Figure 6: Price-to-Earnings Ratio Model 
 
In this model, the data from Computer Sciences Corporation was excluded due to 
a large adjustment in costs of services reported during the time period studied, in 
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response to an SEC audit and allegations of tax fraud.  This drastic change in P/E could 
not be reconciled with data prior to the adjustment.  Additionally, there was a significant 
outlier, the 2010 data for Oshkosh Corporation had a residual that was 4.5 standard 
deviations out, and a Cook’s D Influence of 0.41.  This is likely due to nearly half of its 
revenue in that year coming from a single DoD contract, an abnormally large contract for 
the company.  The data point was retained, as removing it did not have an impact on the 
results with regard to this study, though it did change the p-value of the model from 
0.0057 to 0.0091, and significantly changed the equation coefficients of the model.  
Additionally, as mentioned previously, data points which had negative values were 
retained to preserve statistical relationships even though these would not be used to 
evaluate a company’s financial performance.  Even then, removing these negative data 
points from the model did not significantly alter the results, procurement still had a p-
value of 0.0043 
When validating the model, it initially fails a test for normality; however, when 
several potential outliers are excluded, it passes both normality and constant variance, 
with p-values for the Shapiro-Wilk and Breusch-Pagen tests of 0.1 and 0.63, respectively.  
A Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation returns a p-value of 0.74, indicating no 
autocorrelation. 
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Figure 7: Price-to-Earnings Residuals Histogram 
 
 
Figure 8: Price-to-Earnings Shapiro-Wilk Test 
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Figure 9: Price-to-Earnings Cook’s D Influence 
 
 
Figure 10: Price-to-Earnings Durbin-Watson Test 
 
Current Ratio 
For the CR model, CR lag of one year was used as a variable, in addition to 
procurement, due to it being the only significant variable with regard to CR.  Note that 
both with and without this independent variable in the model, procurement was not 
significant, with a p-value of 0.24 in the final model.  A logarithmic transformation and 
1-year lag for procurement were attempted as well, but these did not yield any different 
results.   
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Figure 11: Current Ratio Model 
 
Only one data point was excluded from the final model, the 2010 data for AAR 
Corporation.  It was excluded due to no historical current ratio available.  The model also 
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passed tests for normality, constant variance, and autocorrelation without the exclusion of 
any further data points.  The p-values for Shapiro-Wilk, Durbin-Watson, and Breusch-
Pagan tests were 0.20, 0.37, and 0.59, respectively.  No points were overly influential in 
the model, and the highest Cooks D value observed was approximately 0.17. 
 
Figure 12: Current Ratio Residuals Histogram 
 
 
Figure 13: Current Ratio Shapiro-Wilk Test 
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Figure 14: Current Ratio Cook’s D Influence 
 
 
Figure 15: Current Ratio Durbin-Watson Test 
 
Profit Margin 
The profit margin model includes a cohort variable in addition to procurement.  
No variables aside from this cohort were found to be significant.  The cohort consisted of 
all the data from Rockwell Collins.  This communications company experienced 
consistent profit margins much higher than the other companies in the study, and 
accounted for 50 percent of the observed variability.  Procurement was not significant, 
with a p-value of 0.19.  Attempting to use logarithmic transformations or a time lag for 
procurement did not change the results of the model. 
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Figure 16: Profit Margin Model 
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Computer Sciences Corporation data was excluded for year 2010 and 2011 
because of large cost of sales adjustments as a result of the SEC investigation mentioned 
previously. 
The model’s residuals are normal after excluding two outliers which were more 
than three standard deviations out, with a resulting p-value for the Shapiro-Wilk test of 
0.29.  The model subsequently passes tests for constant variance and autocorrelation with 
p-values of 0.46 and 0.31, respectively.  No data points were overly influential, and the 
highest Cooks D value was 0.1.   
 
 
Figure 17: Profit Margin Residuals Histogram 
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Figure 18: Profit Margin Shapiro-Wilk Test 
 
 
Figure 19: Profit Margin Cook’s D Influence 
 
 
Figure 20: Profit Margin Durbin-Watson Test 
Revenue 
The model for revenue includes a variable for revenue with a one year lag.  This 
variable accounts for nearly 99 percent of the variability, and its inclusion is necessary to 
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identify if any other variables are significant with regard to procurement and revenue.  
Prior to inclusion of the lag variable, the data indicated that the percentage of revenues 
derived from government contracts was negatively related to revenues, but this likely 
only shows that larger companies which compete for government contracts also do 
business in the commercial sector.  Under this model, procurement could not be linked to 
revenues.  The final model including the revenue lag variable does, however, indicate a 
relationship between procurement and revenues with a p-value of 0.02. 
 
Figure 21: Profit Margin Model 
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After building the initial model for revenues, the revenue from Oshkosh 2010 had 
a Cook’s D Influence value of over 0.6.  Further examination revealed that the revenue 
for this year was abnormally high due to a single $4.5 billion dollar contract with the 
DoD for 7,500 M-ATVs, making up nearly half of the company’s entire revenue.  This 
was an abnormally large contract for the company and not indicative of more general 
procurement spending trends, so that data point was subsequently excluded from final 
model.  Additionally, early models displayed heteroscedasticity, likely due to the 
variability of revenue increasing as revenue gets higher.  To compensate for this, the final 
model uses logarithmic transformations. 
After transforming both revenue and procurement values logarithmically, the data 
passed the tests for normality, constant variance, and autocorrelation.   The p-values for 
Shapiro-Wilk, Durbin Watson, and Breusch-Pagen tests are 0.21, 0.66, and 0.1, 
respectively.  No points were overly influential, and the highest Cooks D value detected 
was approximately 0.29. 
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Figure 22: Profit Margin Residuals Histogram 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Profit Margin Shapiro-Wilk Test 
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Figure 24: Profit Margin Cook’s D Influence 
 
 
Figure 25: Profit Margin Durbin-Watson Test 
 
Revenue Growth 
Several independent variables were shown to be significant with regard to 
revenue growth, however, none of these were overwhelmingly significant, and none were 
significant singly or in any combination when paired with procurement.  As a result, the 
final model included only procurement as an independent variable.  The model did find a 
relationship between procurement and revenue growth, at a p-value of 0.01.  This 
relationship describes approximately 10 percent of the variability in the data. 
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Figure 26: Revenue Growth Model 
 
Like revenue, the revenue growth model excludes the data from Oshkosh 2010.  
No other data points were excluded, and the data passed the tests for normality, constant 
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variance, and autocorrelation.   The p-values for Shapiro-Wilk, Durbin Watson, and 
Breusch-Pagen tests are 0.06, 0.77, and 0.08, respectively.  No points were overly 
influential, and the highest Cooks D value detected was approximately 0.11. 
 
 
Figure 27: Revenue Growth Residuals Histogram 
 
 
Figure 28: Revenue Growth Shapiro-Wilk Test 
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Figure 29: Revenue Growth Cook’s D Influence 
 
 
Figure 30: Revenue Growth Durbin-Watson Test 
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V.  Conclusions and Implications 
Summary 
The purpose of this study was to determine the relationship between procurement 
spending and the financial indicators of prime contractors.  Using data from the FPDS 
and SEC, a statistical analysis was performed on 13 of the DoDs top 100 prime 
contractors over the course of five years to determine if a relationship exists between 
procurement spending and the financial indicators of D/E, P/E, CR, profit margin, 
revenue, and revenue growth.  Of these indicators, P/E, revenue, and revenue growth 
were shown to be related to procurement spending at the 0.05 significance level.   
Conclusions 
A great deal of variability existed in the data set, due to the budget process and 
the heterogeneous nature of defense contractors.  Being from a variety of different 
disciplines, varying sizes, and degrees of reliance on government contracts for revenue, 
each company had different D/E ratios they were comfortable maintaining and different 
degrees of cost efficiency, resulting in vastly different baseline performance between 
companies, which was beyond the scope of this study.  As a result, even in the cases 
where financial indicators were determined to be related to procurement spending, only a 
small amount of the total variability in the data set could be attributed to procurement.  
Nevertheless, procurement spending was found to be related to half of the financial 
indicators examined. 
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Negative Indicators 
This data in this study does not support a relationship between procurement 
spending and D/E ratios, current ratios, or profit margins.  These financial indicators were 
very polarized by company, and only significant events, such as large dividend payments, 
balance sheet adjustments, or unexpectedly large one-time contracts had much impact on 
these indicators.  This suggests that the current prime contractor base has reached a point 
of equilibrium where cost drivers and individual company characteristics are greater 
indicators of financial success in these areas than procurement spending. 
Of the six indicators studied, these three are the mostly closely related to solvency 
and financial risk.  That they showed no relationship with procurement spending should 
ease fears that the defense industrial base will continue to shrink.  While this study does 
not examine reductions in procurement spending an order of magnitude larger than those 
now in effect, the current market appears well equipped to absorb the reductions 
implemented by the 2011 Budget Control Act. 
Positive Indicators 
There does remain some cause for concern regarding procurement spending and 
the performance of prime contractors.  The data did suggest that the other three indicators 
studied are related to procurement spending, and the results were significant more than 
just statistically.  Revenue growth over the examined period for the companies studied 
averaged only 1.7 percent, compared to a 3.7 percent average annual growth rate in GDP 
over the same period. (U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis 2016)  Furthermore, the data 
suggests that procurement levels in the leaner years of the study corresponded to negative 
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revenue growth despite opportunities in non-defense related markets being available to 
many of the companies studied. 
P/E ratios were also shown to have a relationship with revenue, and this was the 
indicator for which procurement explained the most variability within the model, 12 
percent.  Interestingly, this relationship was opposite of what was expected.  As 
procurement spending increased, P/E ratios fell.  Lower P/E ratios are generally linked to 
lower investor confidence in growth potential or a higher level of perceived risk, and this 
does not seem to logically follow as a result of increased procurement spending.  One 
possible explanation for this is that investor response to changing procurement spending 
may be lagged, and due to data limitations, it was not possible to introduce a lag variable 
in this particular model.  It is also possible that share prices were suppressed in spite of 
positive performance measures due to the anticipated negative impact of the 2011 Budget 
Control Act.  Unfortunately, share prices are as volatile as investor perceptions and not 
necessarily directly related to performance indicators. 
As would be expected from the existence of a relationship between procurement 
spending and revenue growth, there was also a relationship between procurement 
spending and annual revenue, though this was initially obscured by the fact that nearly 99 
percent of variability in revenues across the data set was explained by the previous year’s 
revenue.  Revenue was significant at an alpha of 0.05, but very little additional variability 
was explained by its inclusion in the model.  This suggests that at this point previous 
performance is the single best predictor of contractor financial performance, and like the 
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indicators which showed no relationship to procurement, that the defense industrial base 
has reached a point of equilibrium. 
Managerial Implications 
While there is clearly a relationship between procurement spending and some 
indicators of financial performance, it is unlikely that the Budget Act of 2011 will have a 
negative impact on the defense industrial base.  Revenues of defense contractors may be 
impacted by declining procurement spending, as expected, but other more comprehensive 
performance indicators show no relationship with procurement spending in this data set.   
Maintaining a competitive environment for defense contractors is important to 
keeping peace-time costs low and ensuring that adequate surge capacity exists in the 
event of a mobilization, and previous research has already expressed concern about the 
state of the defense industrial base with regard to lack of competition.  This study, 
however, indicates by a lack of relationship between procurement spending and D/E 
ratio, current ratio, or profit margin that the current procurement cuts should be 
insufficient on their own to drive further mergers or negatively impact prime contractors’ 
bottom line.  As a result, if current market conditions are considered acceptable for the 
national defense strategy, it is unlikely that the ongoing Budget Act of 2011 or 
procurement spending cuts of a similar nature will negatively change that outlook. 
This study also contained several examples of revenues increasing by upwards of 
25 percent in a single year, and even 84 percent in one case.  This would seem to indicate 
that the prime contractors included in this study are able to increase capacity to cover a 
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surge in operations even with the lower overall procurement spending levels experienced 
during this time period. 
While some mergers and acquisitions were observed among the top 100 DoD 
contractors over the course of the study, there were also multiple divestitures, where 
assets were sold off so contractors could focus on their core competencies.  It should be 
noted, however, that in these cases, no production capabilities were lost, they only 
changed ownership.  In light of this, current efforts to maintain a competitive defense 
industrial base using the congressionally limited funding available should be sufficient to 
maintain a surge capacity for wartime operations. 
Future Research 
This study covers companies from a list of the top 100 DoD contractors.  As a 
result, while it represents those companies receiving the most government money as a 
result of defense contracts, and subsequently the area where spending could be most 
substantially curtailed, it does not cover those companies which are most at risk, smaller 
privately owned companies with a high reliance on government contracts.  Future 
research could use case studies to focus on these smaller privately owned companies 
providing niche products for the DoD. 
Additional research should also be conducted on other factors beyond 
procurement spending which might impact defense contractors.  This study showed that 
while revenues of the sample population were related to procurement spending, their 
other financial indicators were not.  A better understanding of cost drivers for this 
population will likely provide insight into overall financial performance.  Additionally, 
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there were several companies, specifically those large companies with only a small 
percentage of revenue coming from government contracts, which earned that revenue 
specifically through subsidiaries.  It might be worthwhile to compare parent companies’ 
overall performance to the performance of their defense subsidiaries.  
Finally, this study included data from a relatively short span of time, and as a 
result, much of the variability in the data was the result of company-specific drivers.  A 
focus on a select group of contractors over a longer time interval may reveal additional 
relationships and allow projection of financial indicators into the future. 
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Appendix A:  List of Sample Companies 
1.  L-3 Communications Holdings Inc. 
 
2.  Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation 
 
3.  Computer Sciences Corporation 
 
4.  CACI International Inc. 
 
5.  Harris Corporation 
 
6.  Rockwell Collins Inc. 
 
7.  Jacobs Engineering Group Inc. 
 
8.  Mantech International Corporation 
 
9.  Oshkosh Corporation 
 
10.  Cubic Corporation 
 
11.  Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Corporation 
 
12.  AAR Corporation 
 
13.  AECOM Technology Corporation 
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Appendix B:  List of Examined Independent Variables 
Time Period – Numeric by month, starting with filing month of first K-10 statement 
 
%Gov – Percentage of revenue obtained from the government 
 
Sqrt %Gov – Square root of [%Gov] 
 
%Gov Sq – [%Gov] squared 
 
Cat I – [%Gov] of over 75% 
 
Cat II – [%Gov] of between 25% and 75% 
 
Year – Calendar year over which the majority of the K-10 filling elapsed 
 
PPI - Crude – Rolling 12-month average Producer Price Index for Crude Oil 
 
Exch – Rolling 12-month average US Trade Weighted Exchange Index 
 
Procurement – Weighted average of annual procurement spending 
 
Ln(Pro) – Natural log of [Procurement] 
 
Pro Lag 1 – One-year lag variable for [Procurement] 
Ln(Pro Lag 1) – Natural lop of [Pro Lag 1] 
PE Lag – One-year lag variable for Price-to-Earnings Ratio 
DE Lag – One-year lag variable for Debt-to-Equity Ratio 
CR Lag – One-year lag variable for Current Ratio 
Revenue Lag – One-year lag variable for Revenue 
Ln(Rev) Lag – One-year lag variable for [Ln(Rev)] 
Cohort (8) – Rockwell Collins = 1; all others = 0 
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Appendix C:  JMP Dataset 
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Appendix D:  Quad Chart 
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